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Over the last few years there has been a surge in the literature investigating both the 
gender pay gap (female-male earnings ratios) and occupational segregation 
(predominantly female occupations paying less) in a variety of settings ranging from 
international comparisons to sector-specific studies, and addressing a range of 
possible explanatory characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2000 and 1996; Blau et al, 
1998). The policy implications from considering all the factors leading to unequal pay 
can be very significant, as witnessed by the case in 2004 of the £300million equal pay 
case won by Unison on behalf of women health workers in two Cumbrian NHS 
hospitals, which has been quickly buried in the news for fears of the repercussions it 
could have across the whole of the public sector. The issue is of current relevance 
since as part of the new Equality Bill (2007) the public sector in the UK is asked to 
take proactive steps to positively promote equality rather than solely taking steps to 
prevent discrimination.  
Part of this entails monitoring and addressing the causes of the pay gap which 
raises the issue of what data (and what collection techniques) will be necessary, as 
well as what methods of analysis will be appropriate. This paper contributes to both 
issues in that it addresses the pay gap in a public sector institution making use of the 
data collected by the payroll office, and discusses information shortcomings as well as 
the merits of different techniques for analyzing the gap, which as we will show can 
produce significantly different results.  
Several estimates of the unexplained part of the gender pay gap have been 
produced for the UK economy as a whole but there are no specific sectoral results. 
Olsen and Walby (2004) using the British Household Panel Survey find that in the 
UK the full-time gender pay gap has changed little since the 1990s and the pay gap   3
between  females part-time and males full-time pay has not changed since the mid 
1970s. The study finds that 36% of the gap is accounted for by differences in life-time 
working patterns, labour market rigidities (occupational segregation, work in smaller 
non-unionised firms, etc.) account for 18%, past educational attainment for 8% and 
38% is linked to differences in labour market motivations and preferences and direct 
discrimination. The report also emphasises the effect of indirect discrimination and 
systematic disadvantage, which affect labour market motivations and preferences as 
well as labour market rigidities and the systematic low pay associated with certain 
occupations.  
Data from the Labour Force Survey and New Earnings Survey referred to in 
the Kingsmill Review (2001) suggests that, as higher education institutions are 
autonomous employers, negotiations do play a significant role in determining pay. 
The Bett Report (1999), which focussed specifically on higher education noted not 
only that pay structures were largely unchanged from the 1960’s but “there are real 
concerns about whether universities and HE colleges are fully meeting their statutory 
obligations to ensure equal pay for work of equal value.” “The hard evidence 
available on patterns of employment by gender…  suggest that most HE institutions 
have yet to become model employers as regards equal opportunities.” “Rigidities in 
pay structures and inflexible people management practices… can hinder necessary 
adaptation to technological developments changes in employment patterns outside the 
sector, and variations in the pattern of demand and funding for higher education.” 
(Brett report, quoted in the Kingsmill Review). Currently, data from the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) suggests that women constitute 36% of the full-
time academic staff, and 52% of part-time, reflecting the aforementioned importance 
of part time work by women in the public sector. There is also a literature on the pay 
gap in academic institutions (see for example Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 1998; 
McDowell, Singell and Ziliak, 1999; Blackaby et al, 2005), and most empirical 
studies aim to explain, making use of various factors, the reasons for this apparent 
discrimination between women and men’s wages, as it is difficult to understand the 
nature of the gap from the figures on the difference between average men and 
women’s pay in academia such as those routinely published by the Times Higher 
Education Supplement).  
The higher education sector has been traditionally dominated by male 
academics, but recent years have seen a substantial increase of female academics and   4
the debate on the possible discrimination of women in a traditional male-dominated 
sector has heated up. In 2002 the Joint National Committee for Higher Education 
Staff (JNCHES) published a report entitled “Equal Pay Reviews: Guidance for Higher 
Education Institutions” whose purpose was to identify pay inequalities in order to 
eliminate them. In 2005, data compiled by the Higher Education Statistical Agency 
(HESA) showed that the gap between male and female pay in equivalent jobs was 
around 20%. In the same year, the Times Higher Education, in an article entitled 
“Deplorable pay inequality persists”, published a ranking of Higher Education 
Institutions based on the gaps between female and male professorial and lecturers’ 
salaries. It revealed that the gaps ranged from around 1% to almost 14% for 
professorial salaries and from 0.5% to almost 18% for lecturers. In 2006, a report 
published by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) pointed 
out that the number of female academics was rising at all levels, but women continue 
to be paid less with a mean salary (in 2006) of about £ 38,000 vs. nearly £ 43,000 for 
male academics. All these figures, however, are based on gross figures and fail to 
control for characteristics such as age, experience and subject studied. Focussing on a 
sample of five Scottish universities, Ward (2001) found an aggregate gender salary 
differential for academic staff of 15%, most of which was explained by limited 
opportunity for female academics to combine career and family, given the importance 
of mobility to academic careers. Her analysis also highlights that rank is key to both 
salaries and the pay gap, indicating that opportunities for promotion are very different 
between women and men. Within the economics subject, Blackaby et al (2005) use 
data from a comprehensive questionnaire conducted among women economists in the 
UK which includes information on rank, pay and productivity, as well as career 
breaks and outside offers and job applications, and also perception of discrimination, 
and find that both a gender promotion and within rank gap exist, and outside offers 
play an important role in determining the gap (much more significant than the effect 
of career breaks, which are found to have no significant direct effect on the gap in 
earnings). ‘Women are less likely (for given observable characteristics) to be 
promoted, they receive lower wages in a given rank, they receive fewer job offers, 
gain lower financial reward to outside offers, and they perceive gender 
discrimination’ (Blackaby et al, 2005: 104).  
Our paper makes two novel contributions to this literature: it provides an 
overview of the evolution in the pay gap over the whole population of employees of   5
an academic institution over a period of nine years (1997-2005) controlling for age, 
experience and subject studied, and it tests the sensitivity of results to model 
specification using different decomposition methods.  
 
2. Theoretical  background 
 
There exist many different theories explaining discrimination in the labour 
market (for a survey see Peterson and Lewis, 1999). Neoclassical labour market 
theory expects differences in pay to correspond to differences in productivity, as 
rational employers should hire cheaper labour until wages equalise. It therefore 
explains any remaining differential wages with women’s labour supply choices. The 
human capital model (Becker, 1985, Mincer and Polachek, 1974) is used to explain 
gender differences in qualifications and in work experience as a result of the gendered 
division of labour in the family, with women primarily responsible for reproductive 
work (rearing children, domestic work, caring for other members of the family) 
creating a dis-incentive to investment in their human capital. This model is on its own 
empirically is able to statistically explain only 50% of the wage gap once education, 
training and experience are accounted for. Supply side theories of discrimination 
include Gary Becker’s theory of the ‘taste for discrimination’ in co-workers or 
customers that employers have to cater for and imperfectly competitive markets allow 
discrimination to persist. The discrimination faced in the family would then combine 
with that occurring in the labour market because of employers’ anticipating an 
expected lower productivity, or employers or customers’ tastes (Becker, 1957), or 
again with occupational segregation in lower wage professions. According to this 
theory, when competitive pressure increases a fall in wage discrimination should be 
observed and Blau and Kahn (2000) point to evidence confirming Becker’s prediction 
that discrimination is higher the more a sector is shielded from competitive pressures 
(Becker, 1957), and to experimental studies assessing the probability of being hired 
for women and men and the increases in this probability when sex is not known by the 
employer. However, Bergman (1974) suggests that discrimination may actually be 
profitable if it is generalised practice, as employers who compete only with other 
employers that hire white men at a premium might be able to pass higher prices on 
consumers, and occupational segregation as suggested by institutional labour market 
theory can maintain this state of affairs indefinitely. Moving further from strictly   6
neoclassical assumptions, Phelps’ and Arrow’s theory of statistical discrimination 
suggests that discrimination might be rational and arising through imperfect 
information about the productivity of future employees, so that assumptions about 
gender or race might be used as screening devices. Feminist economists argue that 
pre-labour force discrimination (as that which happens within the household when for 
example decision regarding the amount of education to be given to children or the 
division of child care responsibilities) and socialization play a role. This means that 
explaining discrimination as residual once controlling for human capital and omitted 
variables as is done in the wage gap literature fails to incorporate the discrimination 
that has taken place when investing in human capital and in accumulating on-the job 
experience, which are assumed implicitly to be a free choice, and the fact that part of 
that is internalised by women themselves, who may be less effective at self-
promotion. 
Since the seminal work of Oaxaca and Blinder in 1973, the word ‘wage 
decomposition’ has become incredibly popular in the labour market literature and has 
been widely used to try to estimate the extent of wage discrimination between 
different groups of workers (e.g. females vs. males, ethnic minorities vs. the rest of 
the population). The basic idea behind the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is quite 
straightforward. The observed differences in salary between two sub-groups of the 
working population can be divided into two parts: the first one (also called 
‘endowment’ part) is simply due to differences in the observable characteristics of 
workers which might affect their productivity, the second one is due either to 
unobservable characteristics of workers for which the researchers does not have 
information or to ‘discrimination’ intended as giving inferior treatment to people of 
equal abilities. 
In the case of female-male differences in wages, and assuming that the 
relationship between wages and individual abilities is linear, the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition implies estimating the following two separate wage equations (with 
wages normally expressed in logarithmic form) for males and females by means of 
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and defining the gender pay gap as: 
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where a and b are the OLS estimators of α and β. 
 
The first two terms in the right-hand side of equation (2) are generally used as 
measure of discrimination as they are not linked with observable initial ability 
differences between the two groups. Traditionally they are called ‘differences in 
coefficients’ (including the intercept) or C, while the last term represents ‘differences 
in endowments’ and is normally labelled E.  
The standard Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition has been variously 
modified over the years. Some authors (see for instance Daymont and Andrisani, 
1984, Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) suggested introducing an ‘interaction term’ 
between C and E in equation 2 so that the final model has the form: 
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The problem with this approach resides in defining whether the interaction term is 
part of the explained part or the discrimination part. This partly depends on which 
group is supposed to be the ‘base group’ or, in other words, the ‘non discriminated’ 
one. This is often referred to as ‘index number’ problem in the literature. Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973) both propose to consider either the group with the lowest 
salary (in our case females) or the group with the highest salary (males) as 
comparison group. Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988) both suggest using an average 
between the mean salaries of females and males. Reimers suggests a simple arithmetic 
mean, while Cotton recommends a ‘weighted’ average, with the weights being the 
proportions of each group in the population.  Neumark (1988) points out that “the no-  8
discrimination wage structure is simply the set of coefficients from the pooled 
regression” (pag. 289) where both groups are included. 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the above contributions and their definition of 
‘reference salary’. 
 
Author Reference  salary 
Oaxaca ( 1973) and 
Blinder (1973) 
Either  m X or  f X  
Reimers (1983)  () / 2 mf XX +  
Cotton (1988) 




and  mf nn  are the relative frequencies ( / mm nN N =  
and  / ff nN N = )  
being:  
m N  = number of males,  f N  =number of females 
and  f m NN N = +  
 
Neumark (1988)  Coefficients from pooled regression 
 
 
Results on the extent of discrimination are not only influenced by the choice 
of the reference salary and how to deal with the interaction term, but also on the 
definition of the characteristics to be included as explanatory variables in equation (3) 
and on how representative the sample is of the whole population. Sample bias did not 
represent a problem in our case as we are focusing on salaries in one specific British 
higher education institution (the University of Reading) and have data on the whole 
population of employees for the period 1997-2005.  
 
Our final wage equations are: 
 
(j-6)
12 2 3 45 6




ln age  + age ethn + UK + mode + exp  +










   (4a) 
   9
(j-6)
12 2 3 45 6




ln age  + age ethn + UK + mode + exp  +










        (4b) 
 
Where the explanatory variables are: 
Age = age of employee 
Ethn = dummy variable equal one if employee is Caucasian 
UK = dummy variable equal one if employee is British 
Mode = dummy variable equal one if contract is permanent 
Exp = length of service at University 
D
j (with j=1,2…6) = dummies for subjects (Mathematics & Physics, Psychology, 
Linguistic, Engineering, English, Business) 
 
Ideally, to measure discrimination accurately, productivity variables should be 
included in the analysis, but these are incredibly difficult to find (or create). We were 
unable to add any specific productivity index, as our micro-individual data had to be 
provided in an anonymous format to preserve privacy. In the absence of these 
measures, the unexplained part of the gender gap should be interpreted as an ‘upper-
boundary’ for ‘potential’ discrimination rather than a measure of discrimination itself.  
 
3. Data   
 
The data used come from the University of Reading Payroll Office and include 
the salaries of all the employees from 1997 to 2005. The total number of observations 
over the 9-year period is 30,956 with a minimum of 3,446 observations in 1997 and a 
maximum of 3,606 in 1999 (see Table 3).   10
























(% mal FT) 



























































































As expected, the vast majority of male employees are full-time, while less than half of 
the female employees work full-time. Within the population of full-time workers, the 
percentage of female academics is lower than the male counterpart, though it has 
increased over the 9-year period and it is now around one-third of the female full-time 
population. On the opposite, the percentage of male academics over the male full-time 
population has fluctuated around the value of 50% and no clear pattern is identifiable. 
As far as average salaries are concerned, these are summarised in Table 4 for 
full-time employees and full-time academic employees. 
   11













1997 16,996.21  22,132.67  23,486.75  28,391.88 
1998 17,080.27  22,678.36  23,691.65  28,778.73 
1999 17,358.01  23,699.01  24,686.83  30,609.03 
2000 18,068.24  24,484.53  25,970.21  32,245.95 
2001 20,248.22  26,006.10  26,621.92  33,205.31 
2002 22,201.83  28,040.97  27,992.91  35,004.93 
2003 23,539.46  29,276.95  29,412.47  36,605.61 
2004 24,942.44  30,369.67  31,328.07  37,835.73 
2005 25,117.91  30,859.58  32,349.11  38,690.07 
 
The figures in Table 4 are non-deflated, but, as our purpose is to compare the two 
groups and both are affected by inflation, deflation is not crucial. Partly because of 
inflation, salaries show an upper trend over the 9-year period. In particular, if we 
compare the final value of 2005 with the initial value of 1997, we can see that 
nominal salaries for full-time female employees have increased by around 48% vs. 
around 39% for full-time males. The nominal salaries for academics have increased 
by around 38% for female academics and around 36% for male academics. 
It is also interesting to have a look at the ratios between average
1 female and male 
earnings over time. Figure 1 shows the trend for full-time employees and for full-time 
academics. 





1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Ratio Female/Male FT
Ratio Female/Male FT Academic
 
                                                 
1 Mean and median salaries show similar patterns.   12
 
Figure 1 shows a clear upward trend for female/male ratios for full-time employees, 
but, surprisingly a downward trend for the female/male ratios for full-time academics, 
with a partial recovery after 2003. This phenomenon could partially be explained by 
the age structure of the academic population, with an increase of young female 
academics joining the university in recent years and taking over more junior positions. 
In reality, this is only partially proven by the data. If it is true, on one side, that a 
larger proportion of female academics are in more junior positions (see Figure 2), it is 
also true, on the other side, that the percentage of females in junior position has not 
increased much over our period of analysis (in fact, in the case of lecturers A, the 
percentage of females dropped even more than males). 
 
Figure 2: Percentages of grades by gender – 1997 to 2005 
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It is also interesting to have a look at the female/male average salary ratios by 
‘academic grade’. Figure 3 shows the ratios for professors and lecturers (A and B 
pooled together) for our period of analysis. 
 












1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
The gaps between female and male professorial salaries have been traditionally higher 
than the gaps between female and male salaries for more junior positions (i.e. 
lectureships or research assistant positions), but there might be some evidence of 
‘catching up’ though our period of analysis is to short to identify trends with certainty. 
According to the HESA data published by the THES at the end of 2005, on average 
nationally female professorial salaries are 6.3% lower than male professorial salaries 
while the same figure for researchers is only 3.0%. Our data seem to confirm that, in 









Lecturers   14
4.  Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Decomposition methods and the gap 
 
The aim of this section is to present and discuss the results of our 
decomposition analysis carried out on the lines explained in the theoretical framework 
part. We will present separate results for each year and for two different sub-
populations, i.e. all full-time employees and all full-time academics only. The reason 
why we restricted to full-time employees only is self-evident: it is extremely difficult 
to include part-time employees because there are different degrees of ‘part-time’ and 
standardisation is not straightforward (and sometimes not even desirable as it might 
introduce substantial biases in the sample). We have then restricted to full-time 
academic only and decided to present these results as well because, theoretically, we 
would expect the same decomposition model to perform ‘better’ (i.e. explain more of 
the pay gap) the more homogenous the population. If this is the case, our model 
applied to two populations, one of which is more dis-homogenous than the other, 
should give us substantially different results.  
Our results are summarised in Table 5. The table reports the part of the gap 
which remains unexplained (in %) after controlling for the individual and subject 
characteristics highlighted in equations 4a and 4b. Different columns report the results 
of the different models described in the theoretical framework section (see Table 2). 
The first two columns report the results of the standard Oaxaca and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition when the average female salary and the average male salary are used 
as ‘reference’ salary respectively. As it is to be expected, the unexplained part is 
higher when the higher salary (i.e. the male one) is used as ‘reference’. The third and 
fourth columns report the results of the Reimers and Cotton ‘weighted average’ 
approaches. In the case of full-time employees the two methods give very similar 
results as the percentage of female employees (reported in brackets in the fourth 
column) is close to 50% (in which case Reimers and Cotton would give exactly the 
same results). The Neumark approach gives consistently lower figures than all the 
other models. 
   15




a) Full-time Employees 
 
Year Oaxaca  and 
Blinder 
  f X  
Oaxaca and 
Blinder 
m X  
Reimers   Cotton  Neumark 
1997  74.4 85.2 76.6 76.5  (0.476)  71.0 
1998  74.9 78.8 77.2 77.1(0.471)    71.7 
1999  75.1 79.5 77.9 77.7  (0.469)  73.5 
2000  78.1 80.7 79.6 79.5  (0.478)  75.8 
2001  80.9 81.1 83.5 83.4  (0.479)  79.1 
2002  84.3 86.0 86.7 86.6  (0.477)  82.0 
2003  83.7 89.2 85.0 84.9  (0.459)  79.6 
2004  78.5 83.4 80.9 80.7  (0.454)  76.4 
2005  79.3 84.6 82.0 81.7  (0.449)  77.6 
 
b) Full-time Employees – Only Academic 
Year Oaxaca  and 
Blinder 
f X  
Oaxaca and 
Blinder 
m X  
Reimers   Cotton  Neumark 
1997  39.6 52.8 46.2 49.1  (0.752)  41.7 
1998  44.1 56.0 50.0 52.7  (0.721)  45.7 
1999  47.7 48.7 48.2 48.4  (0.721)  42.2 
2000  52.9 42.2 47.6 45.3  (0.725)  40.8 
2001  53.2 45.1 49.2 47.6  (0.717)  42.7 
2002  48.3 42.4 45.4 44.4  (0.712)  39.0 
2003  42.8 43.5 43.2 43.3  (0.688)  36.9 
2004  60.3 60.2 60.3 60.2  (0.661)  54.3 
2005  59.9 63.0 61.5 61.9  (0.637)  54.4 
 
What is clear from these results is that restricting the analysis to the ‘academic only’ 
population, the part of the pay gap explained by individual and subject characteristics 
increase noticeably: from around 20-25% to around 50% on average. This is in line 
with expectations as the population of academics is a lot more homogenous that the 
overall population of full-time employees. This also tells us that most of the gender 
pay gap is not due to pure discrimination between individuals doing similar jobs, but 
rather to the fact that women perform jobs which, on average, are less qualified and 
                                                 
2 For brevity we decided to report only the percentages of unexplained gaps. Full calculations are 
available from the authors.   16
less remunerative. In other words, there is still a very clear ‘crowding effect’ of 
women into administrative/secretarial type of position and this is clear even when 
restricting to the higher education sector. It cannot be argued that non-academic 
positions offer more flexibility for part-time working to rear children, as our sample 
includes only full-time positions. 
Once we move to the academic sample, the extent of the unexplained pay gap 
moves from around 40% to just above 60% according to the different methods and 
different years used. Although nine years are not enough to positively identify a 
‘trend’, it is worth observing some short-term phenomena, which might be 
representative of a longer-term trend. Surprisingly, the unexplained part of the gender 
pay gap seems to increase over time rather than decrease and this is true especially for 
the academic population. As women move up the ladder and get promoted to more 
senior positions, the unexplained part of the gender gap seem to widen rather than 
getting narrower. One could argue that, because professorial salaries (at least in the 
period analysed) were not linked to a specific pay scale, but rather contracted on an 
individual basis, this contracting process might have penalised (for whatever reason 
including female contracting abilities) female academics. Certainly, more research is 
required on this point to draw a positive conclusion. 
The widening of the unexplained part is partly true also for the population of 
full-time employees as a whole with values over 80% in the period 2001-2003, but 
this seems to have partially reversed in the last two years of the sample and it would 
be interesting to monitor the phenomenon to see whether this will continue in the 
future or it is just cyclical. 
 
4.2 Decomposing the gap by individual characteristics 
 
In the previous section we showed that the Neumark decomposition, which is the 
more sophisticated one, it is also the one which explains the largest part of the gap. 
This section, therefore, discusses in more details the results obtained using this 
approach. Tables 6 and 8 present a decomposition of the ‘explained’ part of the gap 
by ‘component’. Results have been converted in pounds, so that each line represents 
the gross premium (in £) from significant components of the explained part of the gap 
for all years. Table 6 summarises the results when all full-time employees are 
included, while table 8 focuses specifically on the full-time academic population. The   17
variables presented are the significant ones, age (and age squared) are proxies for 
‘general’ experience whereas TimeUni is ‘specific’ experience at the current 
institution. The first thing to note is that the decomposition for the whole full time 
staff leaves a much bigger proportion of the gap unexplained suggesting, as discussed 
above,  that women ‘cluster’ themselves in jobs which, on average, are less qualified 
and less remunerative. Table 7 assesses the extent of  this ‘crowding effect’ (see for 
instance Solberg and Laughlin T. 1995) of women into administrative/secretarial type 
of position. 
 
Table 6: Decomposition of the explained part of gender gap: gross premium in £ 
to males (+) and females (-) 
ALL FULL 
TIME 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
           
Gender Gap 










































Age  -476.4 -404.6 -277.3 -582.3 -808.1 -467.1 -564.7 -313.3 -170.8 
Age^2  670.9 569.2 456.8 813.3 904.7 379.5 482.5 230.4 50.24 
TimeUni  932.7 960.2 1020 859.6 737.8 788.3  883  774  723.5 
UK -13.42  34.29  106.04  92.43 17.57  0  0  9.21  10.05 
White  120.8  75.4 48.9 83.2 52.7  -19.5 112.9 239.6 261.2 
Permanent 13.4  6.9 -65.3  -64.7 -35.1 -29.2 -92.4 9.21  0 
 




127.5 192.0 228.4 240.3 210.8 243.3 225.9 230.4 231.1 
Psychology  -20.1 -27.4 -24.5 -27.7 -26.3 -38.9 -41.1 -27.6 -20.1 
Linguistics, 
Languages 
0 0 0 0  -17.57  -19.46  -10.27 -18.43 -10.05 
Engineering 73.81 109.73 114.2  120.1 131.8 136.2 112.9 101.4 130.6 
English  0  -6.9  8.2  0 0 0 0 0  10.1 
Business  53.7 75.4 65.3 18.5 35.1 48.7 51.3 36.9 50.2 
 
The explained part of the gap is quite small, and suggest that there is a premium to 
women from age (table 7 below shows in fact that they are on average older). 
Experience both per se and at the university gives instead a premium to men, whereas 
no discernible trends exist for being British, white and with a permanent contract. The 
effect of different subjects is as expected, with the sciences giving a premium to men   18
and the humanities to women, reflecting the composition of staff by gender in these 
areas. 
Table 7: Crowding, age and contract type 




Average Age  
(All FT) 
% Perm contract 
(ALL FT) 
 No.  %  over 
female 
staff 
No. %  over 
male 
staff 
Females Males Females Males 
1997 556  69.67  719  49.25  49.46 48.14  69.10 68.41 
1998 572  70.18  713  48.54  48.79 47.52  67.50 67.16 
1999 624 71.31  725  49.56  48.05 47.52  61.50 64.80 
2000 628 71.77  748  52.05  48.21 47.17  60.22 64.47 
2001 559 67.35  699  50.47  47.28 46.15  63.02 64.91 
2002 551 64.00  665  48.90  46.56 46.12  65.87 67.12 
2003 571 63.66  625  48.75  46.00 45.49  66.85 70.44 
2004 564 64.16  626  49.49  45.29 44.96  71.37 70.74 
2005 591 67.47  629  51.18  44.71 44.53  71.62 71.64 
 
 
Table 8: Decomposition of the explained part of the gender pay gap (Academic 





1997 1998  1999  2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005 
Gender Gap 









































Age 2,025  1,619  3,085  5,356  4,489 5,703  4,387  1,476  2,959 
Age^2 -1,900.5  -1,460.3  -2,706.6  -4,825  -4,011 -5,457.3 -4,361.4 -2,079.6 -3,115.6 
TimeUni 834.8 457.4  477.6  579 310.4 735.5  1,116  1,319  694.9 
UK 35.52  35.19  39.80  24.12  71.63  73.75  25.36  67.08  134.49 
White 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 22.36 0 
Perm 1,705.2  1,759.4  2,189.1  2,412.5  2,650.1 2,679.5 2814.61  2057.20  1681.09 
Subjects:                
Math, Physics, 
Meteo 
35.52 70.38  79.61 120.62  167.13  319.57 329.64 223.61 224.15 
Psychology 106.57  158.35  179.11  24.12 -23.88  98.33  177.50  22.36  201.73 
Linguistics, 
Languages 
-17.76 -17.59  0  0  0  -7.01  0  -67.08  -44.83 
Engineering -17.76  35.19 19.90  -24.12 95.50  98.33  -76.07  -67.08  89.66 
English 0  0  0  24.12  23.88  0  0  0  0 
Business 53.29  87.97  19.90  24.12  23.88  49.16  50.71  22.36  67.24   19
Women/men ratio by subject academic staff only 
 
ALL FULL TIME  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Math, Physics, 
Meteo 
15/86 15/98 16/98 16/95 17/91  21/102  16/94  26/103  26/96 
Psychology  18/18 18/18 19/18 24/20 24/16 25/14  29/16  27/17  22/15 
Linguistics, 
Languages 
22/35 21/34 21/34 18/34 21/28 26/24  22/19  23/19  21/16 
Engineering  18/96 19/90 15/83 16/77 18/86 22/86  23/80  16/71  17/81 
English  12/16 12/14 10/14 11/14 12/15 14/16  14/17  14/18  12/20 
Business  9/48 6/54 9/49  11/47  13/48  14/51 21/50  21/49 19/51 
 
 
The gap itself is not very different amongst academics, tough it constitutes a smaller 
proportion of the average male wage. The part of the gap explained by our variables is 
much higher amongst academics since they are obviously more homogeneous in 
terms of qualifications and type of work than the whole university staff. Age and time 
at the university give a premium to men, whereas experience gives a premium to 
women, reflecting the relatively more recent incorporation of women in the academic 




We have decomposed the pay gap at an academic institution using the standard wage 
decomposition techniques and found gaps and explanations in line with the literature 
on the subject. To reiterate, specific caveats to our study include: the absence of a 
measure of efforts (workload models are only starting to be implemented, no access to 
self reported staff time use surveys), which would help to see whether slower women 
progress is associated with being assigned jobs which hinder their career progression; 
and lack of output measures (the RAE information is not by person), which does not 
allow to connect effort to rewards. The differentials found in the date could be 
explained by different effort, by task segregation, by discrimination in the promotions 
process. A general caveat also applies in that the literature has shown that money 
wages are a very incomplete indicator of total compensation (Blau and Kahn, 2000). 
Given the paucity of information available on our sample and the difficulty of not 
being able to follow careers through time, our main contribution has been to focus 
instead on the different results produced by using different wage decomposition 
methods. An important note of caution can be drawn from our estimates and it is that   20
decomposition methods do matter as they lead to considerably different results (in 
some cases the difference being over 10%). This means that reporting different results 
is a must to accurately inform public policies on the subject. 
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